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Abstract
Field tests of a new Information Aggregation Mechanism (IAM) developed via
laboratory experimental methods were implemented inside Intel Corporation for sales
forecasting. The IAM, which incorporates selected features of parimutuel betting, is
uniquely designed to collect and quantize as probability distributions any dispersed,
subjectively held information that might exist. The tests demonstrate the robustness of
experimental results and the practical usefulness of the IAM. The IAM yields predicted
distributions of future sales that are very accurate at short horizons; indeed, more
accurate than Intel’s official in-house forecast 59% of the time. A symmetric game
model suggests why the IAM works.
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1 Introduction
In many companies, internal forecasts of key financial and operational indicators provide
a crucial performance metric and input into production decisions and managing market
expectations. Typically, these forecasts are derived from the analysis of in-house experts,
collecting dispersed information from disparate sources in a process consisting of as much
art as science. In this paper, we study the use of a completely different type of procedure
– an information aggregation mechanism (IAM) based on decentralized competition, mo-
tivated by economic theory, and refined and tested through experimental economics. The
mechanism has been shown to work well in the simple and special cases of laboratory set-
tings. The challenge is to test the robustness of the same mechanism when operating in the
much more complex environment of a Fortune 500 company. Will it successfully aggregate
organizational information about the uncertainty surrounding potential business outcomes?
Does the mechanism reveal information not already apparent in the company’s internal fore-
casting process? Is its operation understandable from the point of view of available theory
and supported by robust econometric analysis of the data?
The purpose of an information aggregation mechanism (IAM) is to collect and aggregate
the information held in the form of the subjective intuitions from a disperse collection of
people. This task requires developing instruments to quantify this information while setting
proper incentives that balance the reward to revealing information against the hazards of free
riding on others’ information. The study of information aggregation in experimental eco-
nomics laboratories has a long history, providing a valuable history of successful mechanisms
based on theoretical principles but refined through practical testing. The ability of markets
to perform the information collection and aggregation functions and the sensitivity of such
performance to the details of the market institution were first observed experimentally by
Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988). Similarly, the possibility that markets might be designed to
perform the aggregation function and implemented inside a business is well known (Chen
and Plott (2002); Plott (2000)). How well do these mechanisms work in a large-scale field
setting? Are the results from the laboratory robust in the field? This paper addresses these
questions
The mechanism studied in this paper shares institutional features with auctions, ex-
changes, and some betting processes. Because some features are also found in parimutuel
betting systems, we call it a Parimutuel Information Aggregation Mechanism (IAM). Indeed,
major features of this mechanism were developed as a response to information aggregation
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shortcomings revealed in betting systems, which have a goal of entertaining participants as
opposed to aggregating their information. At the same time, the design of the mechanism
reflects an attempt to avoid features that might inhibit the application of information aggre-
gation mechanisms inside a business environment. As will become apparent, many features
of the mechanism reflect an effort to draw on experiences derived from the application of
markets to perform a similar function.
We report results from a long-running field experiment in which the IAM is implemented
to forecast unit sales activity by Intel. As an international market leader in the hi-tech
sector with annual revenues over $50 billion, Intel has one of the most recognizable brand
names among American companies and its products are found in virtually all households in
the country. Forecasts of product sales are important both operationally, ensuring sufficient
inventory is available for distribution, and financially, managing market expectations for
shareholder value. With myriad distribution channels, forecasting product sales for the
organization is an incredible task requiring analysts to aggregate information from sales
reports, partner forecasts, and management guidance. As such, the requisite information for
forecasting is dispersed through the firm among a variety of stakeholders. At Intel, we set
up mechanisms to collect and aggregate these pieces of information about future realizations
of units sold for key products. In these mechanisms, the range of values that possible sale
quantities can take is partitioned into a set of non-overlapping intervals, or “buckets.” The
participants in each mechanism are given an opportunity to purchase “tickets” that pay off
when the variable of interest takes a value within a given bucket. Participants are allowed
to buy as many tickets as they wish (up to a budget limit described below) and place them
freely in any of the buckets. In this way, the distribution of tickets placed across the different
buckets yields a potential measure of participants’ beliefs regarding the future realization of
the variable of interest. The information aggregation mechanism automatically aggregates
these beliefs across participants, allowing the construction of “consensus” forecasts while
also obtaining a glimpse into the underlying uncertainty.
We approach the evaluation of performance by posing two questions. The first question
focuses on proof of principle. “Does the process do what it was intended to do?” The second
question focuses on the consistency of the behavior with the principles on which the design
was constructed. “Does it do what it does for the right reasons?” The answers to these
questions are known for tests in laboratory experimental environments. The questions are
now posed for the mechanism performance in a field environment.
The process is intended to aggregate information so the first question asks if it is success-
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ful. Evaluating its success requires assessing the amount of information that might exist in
the environment and characterizing how that information is reflected in the IAM. Section 3
presents a model of information and how the uncertainty in this environment, both related
to outcomes and to odds of outcomes, is represented in the IAM. Given this conceptual
link, we can then test the IAM’s performance by comparing its predictions with realized
results. As success requires accuracy of both the predicted outcome and the likelihood the
IAM assigns to that outcome, the IAM’s accuracy depends both on the process working and
on the existence of information to be collected and analyzed. Excellent prediction perfor-
mance might not be impressive if the prediction is trivial in some sense and not likely to
be repeated in other applications. On the other hand, poor prediction performance could
reflect the lack of information to be aggregated as opposed to any failures of the mechanism’s
collection of the meager information available. Our empirical tests indicate that the IAM
reliably characterizes the uncertainty regarding sales in those settings where Intel has good
information about that uncertainty and that the information reflected by the IAM is not
trivially available through other internal information sources.
The second question addresses the power of the underlying theoretical principles to ex-
plain and interpret the performance of the IAM. The IAM was not developed from first
principles as suggested by the growing literature on implementation theory, so a complete
theory of its construction is not available. Instead the IAM was built on insights drawn from
the behavior of markets and entertainment devices together with features of the rules used
for their operation. While the development of the IAM through experimental testing departs
from a pure theory approach, the controlled exploration of the IAM’s empirical properties
yield theoretical insights into why it works and its sensitivity to details of the environment.
The model of the information and environment developed in the section is extended to a
game theoretic model of individual and systems behavior and information aggregation in
the environment. Clearly the simple theory abstracts from important features of real-world
interaction that could complicate information aggregation and underline theoretical skep-
ticism about possible mechanism success. Section 3 addresses many complicating issues.
Nonetheless, even in the presence of complicating features, the IAM may successfully aggre-
gate information in accordance with well-understood economic principles. Establishing this
possibility motivates the notion of information aggregation outcome as a null hypothesis,
the observable implications of which we develop in the first half of Section 4. Importantly,
we develop tests for this null hypothesis in a reduced form model to ensure their robustness
to structural misspecification.
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Testing the performance of Intel’s IAM implementation is complicated by the fact that we
don’t observe the true unknown distribution over sales in the field. In addition to the IAM’s
aggregated forecasts, we also have access to an internally-prepared “official” forecast that can
serve as a contemporaneous benchmark providing an indicator of the quality of information
that exists within the organization at the time of the IAM run. Beyond six months before
the quarter ends, the forecast errors from both the IAM and the official forecast are as large
as the standard deviation of sales themselves. However, forecast errors become much smaller
as the horizon narrows, indicating that information improves substantially, especially in the
last month before the quarter ends. Together, these findings support the natural hypothesis
that Intel’s information about sales uncertainty is much better at shorter horizons than
longer horizons. This benchmark will allow us to verify that the IAM accurately reflects the
uncertainty in sales in contexts where Intel has good information about that uncertainty, in
comparison with those situations in which good information did not exist.
Our empirical analysis uncovers two central findings confirming the effectiveness of Intel’s
IAM implementation. First, in terms of aggregating information, we find that the IAM
accurately characterizes uncertainty in sales at those forecast horizons when the participating
individuals have good visibility into that uncertainty. In a simple reduced form test, the IAM
beliefs over unit sales matches the distribution of realized sales up to three months before
the end of the quarter. The result establishes that, when the information existed to be
aggregated, the IAM effectively gathered and aggregated it. At forecast horizons beyond
six months, the mechanism’s forecast distribution reflects a tendency to overstate expected
sales consistent with the official forecast’s bias and also tends to understate the dispersion
of uncertainty, underweighting low probability events and illustrating a “reverse favorite-
longshot bias.”
Second, we show that the IAM reveals information about sales not available in the official
internal forecast. We find the expected outcome reported by the mechanism robustly out-
performs the official sales forecast, delivering lower forecast error in 59% of the IAM’s runs.
The relevance of this performance is highlighted by considering the ex-post optimal combi-
nation of the two forecasts. This optimal combination of forecasts heavily weights the IAM
positively and assigns a negative weight to the official forecast across all forecasting horizons.
Rather than questioning the value of the IAM as a forecasting tool, these findings question
the information value of the official forecast relative to the IAM. Though this robust outper-
formance may be driven by other, non-informational, purposes the official forecast serves in
the organization, the information value of the IAM forecast’s is clearly substantial.
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2 The Information Aggregation Mechanism Structure
A connection between markets and information transmission dates back to the foundations
of economics (The intuition is clearly seen in Hayek (1945) and Fama (1970) begins to be
formalized with Green (1973, 1977) and see Allen and Jordan (1998) for a review of this
early formal development and general principles for the existence of rational expectations
equilibrium). The theoretical results suggested that markets are capable of collecting and
aggregating information, though exactly how that might happen remains an open question.
The existence of such possibilities suggests that it is possible to design an Information Ag-
gregation Mechanism with the purpose quantify and collect information that might be held,
in the form of vague and subjective intuitions, by dispersed individuals. The hope is that
the collection and aggregation of this information produces a combined signal that has more
information content than any single signal.
2.1 Experimental Foundations for Information Aggregation
Motivated by theoretical suggestions of informationally efficient markets and rational ex-
pectations, Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988) looked to experiments as tools for examining the
possibility. Plott and Sunder (1982) first demonstrated the ability of continuous double
auction markets to transfer information from “insiders” who have information about the
state to non-insiders who do not. Plott and Sunder (1988) builds on this initial finding,
demonstrating further that the information transmission and collection can go beyond the
simple transfer of information to a process of aggregating the information contained in mul-
tiple, independent sources. That is, market-based systems could effectively transfer “soft”
information that exists in the form of intuitions into a quantitative signal consistent with
Bayes Law. Of significance to the current design of an IAM, they demonstrated that the
ability of markets to perform this task is dependent on the trading instruments available. In
particular, markets perform the collection and aggregation well if populated by a complete
set of Arrow-Debreu securities.1
The first application of a market based IAM inside a business was conducted in 1996 by
Chen and Plott (2002) inside Hewlett Packard Corporation. They implemented a complete
1Information aggregation does not necessarily happen if the market has a single compound security and
all agents do not have the same preferences. However the prices in a single compound security are related
to the competitive equilibrium based on private information. This property, which is common to a private
information equilibrium, was demonstrated experimentally by Plott and Sunder and expanded further by
Berg et al. (2008).
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set of Arrow-Debreu securities to aggregate information about future sales. The possible sales
were divided into states, each state supporting an Arrow-Debreu security, and a continuous
double auction market was opened for each of the securities. Since the payoff of the winning
security was one and the payoff of losing securities was zero the prices of the complete set of
securities could be interpreted as a probability distribution over the states. The mechanism
was reported as successful but its use was limited due to difficulties related to coordinating
and managing the mechanism. Many of the features of the IAM developed and tested
here emerged in response to difficulties relating to deploying market-based IAM’s inside
businesses.
The design of the IAM reported and studied here shares some features with parimutuel
betting processes - hence the reference to parimutuel incentives. In a parimutuel betting
system participants buy tickets on states of nature, such as the winner of a horse race, and
tickets are sold at a fixed price. The revenue from all ticket sales are accumulated, called
the purse, and paid to the holders of tickets on the winning bucket. The odds computed
from this process reflect the number of tickets sold for a bucket divided into the size of the
purse. There is a strong tendency for the odds to be related to the frequency with which
the winner occurs. That tendency, which suggested a principle for a new type of IAM, was
clearly established experimentally by Plott et al. (2003).
The parimutuel incentives in the IAM implemented at Intel differ from those in entertainment-
based partimutuel betting systems in fundamental ways. First, tickets are not sold at a fixed
price, but rather prices increase at a pre-announced rate in order to encourage a timely
completion of the process. Our specific timing setup is informed by the experiments in Ax-
elrod et al. (2009) that demonstrate the importance of structuring the process to encourage
participants to buy their tickets early rather than waiting until the last second in an at-
tempt to free ride on information supplied by others.2 Second, for purchasing the tickets,
participants are allocated a fixed budget of a synthetic currency that had no value other
than to buy tickets in the designated IAM. The use of a synthetic currency follows Plott
and Roust (2009), and works to mitigate the negative impact of risk aversion on information
2Plott et al. (2003) demonstrated that the tendency to wait until the last second to buy tickets contributed
to the creation of bubbles and retarded successful information aggregation. This property was replicated
by Kalovcova and Ortmann (2009). In a very simple parimutuel betting system information is transferred
through a process of observing betting and the importance of observing others in a parimutuel betting system
context is examined by Koessler et al. (2012). Ottaviani and Sørensen (2004) present a theoretical analysis
for the timing of bets in parimutuel betting systems, deriving results consistent with several of these exper-
imental findings. The unique timing features in Intel’s IAM help mitigate the impact of these incentives on
information aggregation and provide an important differentiation between the IAM and parimutuel betting.
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aggregation.3 Finally, the mechanism is not self-financing, with management providing a
fixed cash prize distributed in proportion to the number of tickets in the winning bucket.
The IAM which we ran in Intel also features important differences from prediction systems
based on markets, which have flourished in recent years.4 Most importantly, the tickets
placed by IAM participants are not securities, and cannot be traded. Price speculation,
which takes place in markets, cannot take place here. This payoff structure differs from
prediction markets, where securities are traded by market participants over time. Manski
(2006) discusses the difficulties in interpreting prediction market prices when participants
may have heterogeneous beliefs, highlighting the issues not only in interpreting the data
but also in the ability of the market mechanism to successfully aggregate information. The
IAM is also less exposed to a “thin market” pheonomenon, as thin trading in a market
can severely inhibit aggregation.5 The timing features of our IAM (described above) were
adopted to mitigate these problems. As such, our IAM is substantially removed from the
features of an asset market. Indeed, the timing of the IAM is coordinated to be compatible
with the busy schedules of participants. There is a fixed, pre-announced start and end time
so that people know when to log in to actively participate. The sessions themselves are timed
to hit key points of the Intel business cycle. By design, the output of the IAM is freshly
available to other business processes that use it.
Another distinguishing feature of the Intel IAM is its freedom from the self-selection
and participation-induced bias. Successful information aggregation balances an individual’s
strategic influence in the IAM, as measured by their impact on the final distribution over
tickets, with the quality of their private information. This balance is often upset by agents’
participation decisions, which exacerbate the influence of heterogeneous risk aversion, outside
wealth, and behavioral biases. These selection issues arise prominently in prediction markets
for entertainment purposes, which typically rely on participants selecting themselves to vol-
untarily engage in the mechanism, guided by the belief that increasing the size of the crowd
3Risk aversion has a tendency to inhibit participation even though an agent is informed and thus prevents
information from getting into the system. Plott and Roust (2009) demonstrate that poor performance of the
mechanism is closely related to poor information and to the extent that risk aversion diminishes the quality
of information the removal of risk aversion is important.
4The Iowa Electronic Markets constituted the first “prediction markets” in the sense that the price of
a binary security can be viewed as a probability and used to predict elections (see Berg et al. (2008) for
a survey of these applications). Internal corporate prediction markets were broadly deployed at Google
(Cowgill et al. (2009)) to gauge employees’ sentiments on everything from company’s performance to general
industry issues, though the information relayed by these markets were often biased by participation effects.
5This was an issue encountered in the Hewlett-Packard IAM implemented by Chen and Plott (2002).
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maximizes its wisdom.6 By contrast, Intel management invited IAM participants chosen for
the information to which they had access given their position in the organization. This inter-
vention ensures the population consists of relatively homogeneous participants, mitigating
potential imbalances that might complicate information aggregation.
Finally, we set up IAM’s for sales forecasting that elicit participants’ beliefs about vari-
ables (unit sales) that can take many (>>2) values. Specifically, we set up a complete set
of simultaneous instruments, one for each value that the variable can take. This approach
contrasts with many prediction markets, in which the outcome of interest is binary (or oth-
erwise takes a small number of values); for instance, whether Obama or Romney would win
the latest presidential election. Our approach operationalizes a general intuition (see Plott
(2000)) that information aggregation is limited by the dimensionality of the “message space”
in which market participants operate. Taken as a whole, the activity in all these markets
yields a complete probability distribution over the event space that, ideally, will reflect the
aggregation of private information about the various possible outcomes.
2.2 The IAM inside Intel
For description purposes we will consider a single variable, say unit sales for product i in
quarter t, that we denote by Yi,t. The positive real line is partitioned into K intervals, or
“buckets,” where each interval represents a range of possible values for sales that will be
officially reported at the end of the sales period. The leftmost and rightmost buckets are,
respectively, [0, x1) and [xK−1,∞).
Participants interact with the mechanism in the form of an on-line interactive program.
Mechanism organizers invite participants, who securely log in to their own account to access
the IAM program. The mechanism makes “tickets” available for sale to participants, who
spend an endowment of Francs (our synthetic experimental currency) on tickets and allocate
them across the buckets. At the opening of each application all participants are given a fixed
budget of 500 Francs for each of the predicted variables. The Francs cannot be transferred
among participants, used in other applications, or assigned to buckets for another variable’s
IAM. As quality controls over the mechanism’s operation, the IAM operates at a fixed
6This phenomenon may be accentuated in horse-racing parimutuel markets, in which individual decisions
may be directed by the thrill of uncertainty and surprise rather than the desire to profit from exclusive
information. While Woodland and Woodland (1994) and Gray and Gray (1997) find that thick betting
markets for professional sports tend to satisfy market efficiency, a host of papers have explored potential
cases of inefficiencies in recreational betting markets. Jullien and Salanie (2000) and Chiappori et al. (2009)
discuss the identification and estimation of risk preferences using data from parimutuel markets.
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time and only those invited are able to participate. The IAM program stores a wealth of
data, including individual participant actions and time-stamps indicating when each of these
actions took place.
The tickets for all buckets are priced the same and that price will move up at a pre-
announced rate to ensure the mechanism closes in a reasonable time. For example, the
opening price would be constant for fifteen minutes and then go up at a rate of one Franc per
minute after that. These price changes discourage waiting until the last second to purchase,
helping to offset individual incentives to hold back their private information and to improve
their own information by learning from others’ decisions. All participants are aware that their
own information might be improved through seeing the purchases of others. They are also
aware that their own information might be communicated by their own purchase of tickets.
Inducing temporal discounting helps to mitigate these strategic incentives that otherwise
hinder successful information aggregation. The price increase is constant but sufficiently
substantial that by 40 minutes into the exercise the ticket prices are so high that the budget
has little purchasing power. Notice, that this process is fundamentally different from betting
processes.
Throughout the operation of the mechanism, participants have a continuously available
record of the number of tickets that are currently placed in each of the buckets. At each
instant during the application as well as at its termination, the placements of all tickets
in all buckets are known. The individual participant also knows the proportion of tickets
he or she holds in each bucket, which is particularly important because these proportions
are the foundations for incentives. When the actual winning bucket becomes known those
holding tickets in that bucket are given a part of a grand prize equal to the proportion of
the winning bucket tickets that he or she holds. If participant n holds z% of the tickets sold
for the winning bucket then participant n gets z% of the incentive prize. For example, if the
incentive prize was $10,000 and the individual held 10% of the tickets sold for that bucket
then the payment to participant n would be $1,000.
Participants depend on the nature of the forecasting exercise. For forecasts of variables
that have significant influence on financial performance, only insiders, those with access
to limited financially relevant information, are permitted; forecasts that are not considered
material to earnings reports may include a wider group. Typically, the forecasters are insiders
with direct access to the most the information relevant to the forecasting problem, either
directly involved in management or sales. Data already available (to the insiders), including
current signals and historical results, are packaged for all participants to study in preparation
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for the IAM exercise, establishing a base of relevant information to provide an underlying
distribution of common knowledge. As such, it is important to synchronize the start time so
that those individuals with appropriate information could participate.
A typical IAM exercise involves forecasting for the current quarter plus the three upcom-
ing quarters. The exercise takes place once a month and requires on the order of 30 minutes.
Each participant is given a separate Franc budget for each item they forecast. All budgets
are the same size and the budgets are not fungible across the items forecast. The number of
participants varies from ten to twenty-five and each operates from a secure computer located
wherever the participant happened to be located, home, office, traveling, etc. Typically the
users are anonymous within the mechanism: both the list of participants and the winners
are secret. Of course, the total of tickets purchased in each bucket of each forecast is public
and known in real time as the tickets are purchased.
3 A Model of the Information Environment and Ag-
gregation
We present a model for extending the application of the mechanism to field environments,
facilitating the interpretation of the data and subsequent testing in terms of information
aggregation. The modeling effort proceeds in three parts. We begin by characterizing the
nature of the randomness in the field environment in 3.1. Here we depart from a parametric
tradition in which uncertainty is represented by an unknown expectation for an unknown
state variable. As opposed to this single point that might be identified with certainty, the
information we which to aggregate is intended to capture a minimally parametric represen-
tation of uncertainty in the full distribution of the state. In analyzing these distributions
over distributions, we propose a natural signal technology for how participants acquire in-
formation. With a precise definition of information in 3.2, we evaluate the implications of
individual decisions when that behavior is structured from rule-of-thumb ticket purchases.
We show that, if individuals follow this rule of thumb, the mechanism will aggregate infor-
mation and the relative ticket allocation in the IAM will match the conditional uncertainty
in sales. We then show, in 3.3, that information aggregation is attained in the unique, sym-
metric Nash equilibrium any IAM in which participants arrive at common posterior beliefs.
Imagination leads to many reasons why the IAM might not work. Such possibilities are
discussed in Section 3.4.
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3.1 A Model of Information Aggregation in the IAM
We start with a simple model using a Dirichlet sampling framework to represent the links
among the environment, individual beliefs, and information aggregation in the IAM. Recall
that we partition the set of feasible sales into a set of K ranges or “buckets,” denoted by
x1, . . . , xK . Without loss of generality beyond this discretization, we can characterize the
conditional probability that realized sales fall into a given bucket with a K-point multinomial
distribution:
Y |pi ∈

x1, with prob. pi1
x2, with prob. pi2
· · · · · ·
xK , with prob. piK
(1)
The cell probabilities given by pi = (pi1, . . . , piK)
′ are unknown quantities, about which agents
are endeavoring to learn. Their uncertainty about these quantities corresponds to a distri-
bution over distributions, a modeling environment for which the Dirichlet is particularly
well-adapted.7
Suppose agents start off with a (common) prior that pi follows a Dirichlet distribution with
non-negative parameters α = (α1, . . . , αK)
′, supported on the K-dimensional unit simplex.
The prior distribution and expectation for the cell probabilities are denoted:
pi ∼ Dir (α1, . . . , αK) , E [pik] = αk∑K
j=1 αj
(2)
Suppose further that each agent updates her beliefs about pi upon observing noisy signals
of pi. Specifically, an agent observes mn signals sn,1, . . . , sn,mn , drawn independently from
MN(pi). From these mn signals, the agent can compute sample frequencies pˆn,1, . . . , pˆn,K ,
where pˆn,k =
1
mn
∑mn
j=1 1 {sn,j = k}, the sample frequency with which the signal falls into the
k-th bucket. Given these conjugate distributional assumptions, the posterior distribution for
7The Dirichlet distribution has also been used in other contexts (eg. Rothschild (1974)) to study learning
and sampling in a discrete setting. It features prominently in the examples from Ottaviani and Sørensen
(2010).
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pi conditional on these signals will also be Dirichlet, corresponding to:
pi|sn, α ∼ Dir (α1 +mnpˆn,1, . . . , αK +mnpˆn,K) (3)
E [pik|sn, α] = αk +mnpˆn,k
mn +
∑K
j=1 αj
≡ p˜n,k
In this setting, we want to examine whether information aggregation should occur –
that is, whether the distribution of ticket placements coincides with the “true” or expected
probabilities for the underlying distribution of sales Y based on all agents’ information. Add
the simplifying assumption that the signals are independent across agents, let M =
∑N
n=1mn
denote the total number of signals and let pˆk =
1
M
∑N
n=1
∑mn
j=1 1 {sn,j = k} be the proportion
of all signals in bucket k. We obtain the aggregated posterior distribution across all N
agents:
pi|s1, . . . , sN , α ∼ Dir
(
α1 +
N∑
n=1
mnpˆ1,n, . . . , αK +
N∑
n=1
mnpˆK,n
)
(4)
E [pik|s1, . . . , sN , α] = αk +
∑N
n=1mnpˆn,k
M +
∑K
j=1 αj
≡ p˜k
This last posterior distribution, pi|s1, . . . , sN , α represents the fully aggregated informa-
tion regarding the distribution of the outcome variable Y available to participants. Intu-
itively, each individual’s draws from the multinomial distribution correspond to mn “pieces”
of information about the true distribution for Y and the Dirichlet distribution provides a
convenient summary of the total information revealed to individuals.
Note that the posterior beliefs still allow for aggregate uncertainty in the cell probabilities
themselves to persist in the populations’ information set. That is, while the expected cell
probabilities are fixed, the realized cell probabilities remain random with a positive variance.
Nonetheless, these expected cell probabilities represent all the information available about
the uncertainty in how realized sales will turn out as opposed to a principle that rests on
the possibility that no uncertainty exists. This allows us to define “successful” information
aggregation in the mechanism in expectation as:
Definition 1 (Information Aggregation in Expectation). We say the IAM aggregates infor-
mation in expectation if the expected cell probabilities are proportional to the allocation of
12
tickets within the IAM.
Now, given a large number of independent signals, then as M →∞, either because each
agent receives a lot of information (mn becomes large) or many agents receive information (N
becomes large), the law of large numbers ensures that full-information posteriors converge
to the true probabilities:
p˜k =
αk +
∑N
n=1mnpˆn,k
M +
∑K
j=1 αj
→ pik, k = 1, . . . , K. (5)
This allows us to define what “exactly successful” information aggregation in the mech-
anism means as:
Definition 2 (Exact Information Aggregation). We say the IAM aggregates information
exactly if the true unobserved cell probabilities, conditional on available information, are
proportional to the allocation of tickets within the IAM.
These two definitions contrast the aggregate uncertainty in outcomes, characterized by
the cell probabilities pi, and the aggregate uncertainty in the distribution over outcomes,
characterized by the Dirichlet posterior distribution. Clearly, as these definitions do not
explicitly rely on the Dirichlet structure, they can be readily interpreted as applying to any
measurable setting.
3.2 Individual Behavior and Information Aggregation
We begin our analysis by demonstrating that a simple strategy of ticket placement can lead
the distribution over tickets in the IAM to match the posterior expected cell probabilities.
Suppose player n follows a simple “naive” or “straight-forward” strategy that places νn,k
tickets in bucket k proportionally to their privately observed signals, so that νn,k ∝ pˆn,k.
Suppose further that every player is equally endowed with C units of currency and equally
informed via (m) independent signals and prior beliefs are diffuse (so that α is arbitrarily
small). Then, trivially, the distribution over tickets will be proportional to the average signal.
νk ∝ pˆk =
(
M +
∑K
j=1 αj
)
M
p˜k − 1
M
αk ≈ p˜k (6)
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We note that this simple strategy underweights the prior beliefs of agents, so if individ-
uals follow this behavioral rule, the distribution reported by the IAM will display a small
distortion from failing to incorporate prior information. This distortion could be remedied
by seeding the IAM with the prior distribution, which is public and common knowledge by
assumption. However, if the prior is genuinely diffuse (i.e., as α→ 0), then the distortion be-
comes arbitrarily small and the na¨ıve strategy will lead the IAM to aggregate information in
expectation. Further, if the number of participants becomes large or the participants become
arbitrarily well informed about (i.e., as M → ∞) then the IAM will aggregate information
exactly. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. [Information Aggregation from Na¨ıve Behavior]
• Suppose the information aggregation environment is characterized by the distributional
assumptions embedded in equations 1 - 5.
• Suppose further that players reveal their private information by following a na¨ıve strat-
egy that places their tickets proportionally their private signals, so that νn,k ∝ pˆn,k.
Then as α→ 0, the IAM aggregates information in expectation:
νk ∝ pˆk →
α→0
p˜k = E [pik|s1, . . . , sn, α]
Further, as information accumulates, with either N → ∞ or m → ∞, then the IAM
aggregates information exactly:
νk ∝ pˆk →
M→∞
pik.
This simple result follows immediately from equation 6 and highlights the complex bal-
ancing act that gives rise to successful information aggregation. The aggregated informa-
tion set balances each player’s private signal content with their ticket purchasing capacity.
With agents that are completely unresponsive to the external environment, information ag-
gregation occurs so long as these features are exogenously balanced, achieved here by the
assumption that all players are equally informed and have equal budgets. This feature high-
lights the importance of management’s role in determining IAM participants, the synthetic
currency, and the dynamic interactions among participants. Participant selection ensures
the subjects in the IAM are as well-informed as possible. The synthetic currency encourages
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participants to spend all of their budget, mitigating risk aversion’s impact on participation
as a complicating feature. Finally, the dynamic interactions of subjects in the IAM are de-
signed to facilitate communicating both the content of their information and their relative
informedness to achieve this balance.8 The following result summarizes this finding:
Result 1 (Na¨ıve Behavior Supporting Information Aggregation). If individuals follow the
rule of thumb of purchasing tickets in proportion to their observed information, the mecha-
nism will aggregate information and the relative ticket allocation in the IAM will match the
conditional uncertainty in sales.
3.3 Information Aggregation and Agreement as an Equilibrium
Property
Suppose all information in the system is publicly revealed, so that every participant in the
IAM agrees on the posterior distribution for pi and the posterior expected cell probabilities,
so that p˜n,k = p˜k for all players. Given a common prior and common knowledge of rational-
ity, the result from Aumann (1976) stipulates this sort of agreement would be a necessary
feature for any equilibrium in the mechanism. This property allows the model to abstract
from the complications induced by strategic communication, providing a clear and tractable
perspective on the possibility of informative equilibria in the IAM in settings with rational
expectations.
In this environment, an obvious symmetric Nash equilbrium exists, namely one where in-
dividuals place their tickets proportionally to the jointly agreed upon posterior expected cell
probabilities, νn,k ∝ p˜k,∀n, k. In fact, this equilibrium is the unique symmetric, simultaneous
equilibrium in the IAM, which we establish in the next Proposition.
Proposition 2. [Information Aggregation as an Equilibrium Property]
8Without considering the dynamic elements of the IAM, one might be tempted to suggest this result
indicates players’ endowed budgets be proportional in some sense to the quantity of private information
they have available. If players have heterogeneous endowments of information and follow the na¨ıve strategy
proposed here, such a heterogeneous endowment would be necessary for unbiased information aggregation.
However, this analysis ignores the possibility that players can choose to place tickets in an “uninformative
manner. In particular, players may place a portion of their tickets according to their private information
and, after a while, place their remaining tickets in a manner that preserves the relative distribution over
tickets in the IAM. This consideration highlights the role dynamic interactions regarding “quantity” of ticket
placements play in allowing participants to modulate their position according to their “quantity” of private
information
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• Suppose the information aggregation environment is characterized by the distributional
assumptions embedded in equations 1 - 5. Suppose further that all private signals are
publicly revealed, so that p˜n,k = p˜k = E [pik|s1, . . . , sn, α] ,∀n, k
• Suppose tickets are infinitely divisible and each player places their tickets proportionally
to the posterior expected cell probabilities, so that νn,k ∝ p˜k,∀n, k.
This behavioral strategy represents the unique symmetric equilibrium outcome with agree-
ment, under which the IAM aggregates information in expectation. Further, as information
accumulates and M →∞, then p˜k → pik and the IAM aggregates information exactly in this
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 indicates that, if private information can be effectively communicated, the
IAM’s incentives will lead to information aggregation through equilibrium regardless of sub-
jects’ initial endowments of wealth and information. Further, the IAM stabilizes in a state
where it aggregates information, in the sense that players do not have an incentive to dis-
rupt the IAM. Since the conditions assumed here are essentially equivalent to the definition
of an ex-post equilibrium, the result should not be terribly surprising. However, it high-
lights the simple link between rational expectations, the IAM’s incentives, and information
aggregation.
Result 2 (Symmetric Equilibrium with Agreement Supports Information Aggregation).
Information aggregation within the IAM can be supported as a unique, symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
3.4 Complicating Features and the Non-Necessity of Information
Aggregation
The theoretical development thus far illustrates the principles underlying the IAM process to
conceptually motivate the transition from the laboratory to the field environment. Clearly,
the theoretical arguments above do not establish information aggregation as a necessary
feature of the IAM, but just as a possible feature with firm theoretical grounding that one
might reasonably expect to carry over from the lab to the field. Many unmodelled features
in the real world complicate the simple model of incentives and information here and might
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lead the IAM to fail in aggregating all information. While the equilibrium model supports an
interpretation of information aggregation as guided by incentivized behavior, it also suggests
conditions under which information aggregation might not be observed. Further, many
alternative models of behavior exist which might not support information aggregation as an
outcome of the IAM. These theories have potential for helping identify limitations to the
successful operation of the IAM and highlight the degree to which successful information
aggregation presents a surprising result
Many environmental features might complicate information aggregation even in the con-
text of equilibrium models with perfectly rational agents. Thin markets can operate to
reduce information expressed in prices. For example, an individual who knows a ticket will
win with near certainty has no incentive to buy more than one ticket if it is the only ticket
sold. Thus, without sufficient competition the available information might not find its way
into the relative volumes of ticket sales. As further illustrated in Ottaviani and Sørensen
(2010), strategic behaviors could also degrade the information contained in market odds.
Though costly ticket purchases cannot be viewed as cheap talk,9 participants are aware of
the possibility that others are watching purchases and thus have an incentive to mislead
others as well as hide what they know. These incentives might cause the agreement property
on which information aggregation is based to not be satisfied. Another theoretical compli-
cation arises from the existence of multiple, possibly asymmetric, equilibria, which are likely
to arise in more realistic models.
Beyond theory, practical features might complicate the successful operation of the IAM.
While the starting time of the IAM is well known, the participants must operate on a business
schedule. Because ticket prices go up as time progresses, a late arrival might have limited
purchasing power and the participant’s information would not get into the system. The
timing difficulties could be correlated with information with those with the best information
facing the most constrained time. The result would be a bias of the information available to
the IAM.
Any number of individual behavioral properties could work to degrade or remove the
information aggregation capacities of the IAM. How individuals quantize their beliefs or
9The performance of a mechanism without incentives (cheap talk) is explored by Bernnouri et al. (2011)
as are the success of different measures of information aggregation. One might worry that these payments
could provide a disincentive for employees to communicate information amongst each other during day-to-
day operations, as they seek to exploit their information for advantage in the IAM. Contacts at Intel did
not report any such behavior, but the possibility indicates the importance of balancing IAM incentives with
other operational incentives.
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whether intuitions can be captured by subjective probabilities are open research questions.
Individuals could ignore the information contained in IAM odds, thus failing to update pub-
lic information to their private information when making ticket purchases. A ”long shot”
bias may be an inherent property of individual decisions under uncertainty. Similarly, indi-
viduals could ignore their private information and simply mimic the decisions of others in
a Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) style cascade. Manski (2006) shows that
prices from prediction markets need not reflect the mean beliefs of traders in those markets,
even when participants observe price-related information, due to essential breakdowns in the
balance highlighted by Proposition (1). Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) present conditions un-
der which prediction market signals correspond to mean beliefs, underscoring the importance
of accounting for risk aversion in individual behavior. As these risk attitudes could create
a wedge between purchases and subjective probabilities, the degree to which the reported
prices match the frequency of observed outcomes is an empirical question.
4 Testing the Information Aggregation Mechanism
If subjects possess information about the distribution of sales and if the mechanism works,
then realized sales outcomes will reflect the aggregated distribution of tickets within the
IAM. This section focuses on evaluating the degree to which the information reported by the
IAM accurately reflects the uncertainty in sales. Our key finding is that the IAM performs
well in those settings where the organization had good visibility into the uncertainty in sales,
an outcome that would not be feasible if the IAM did not successfully aggregate information.
In settings where the organization has very limited visibility into future sales, there is little
information for the IAM to aggregate as reflected in the accuracy of its reported distributions
over sales.
There are two ways that we could empirically reject the hypothesis that the IAM works to
aggregate subjectively held information about sales. First, it could produce an unreasonably
accurate prediction of sales data when no information existed to be aggregated. Second, it
could produce a poor prediction of sales data when information existed to be aggregated.
The composite nature of our hypothesis in a natural observational environment precludes
a structural test of the motivating theory from the previous section. As such, we consider
reduced-form tests of the information aggregation property’s observable implications in Sec-
tion ?? that compare the full distributions reported by the IAM to the realized outcomes.
These tests would allow us to reject the hypothesis that the mechanism aggregates infor-
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mation efficiently for any number of reasons. However, given results that the aggregated
beliefs reported by the IAM effectively match the empirical distribution of outcomes, it is
inconceivable that such a complex outcome could arise simply by random chance.
4.1 Mechanism Outcomes, Sales, and Forecast Evaluation Data
We observe data on actual sales, the official forecast, and the outcome of the IAM from 2006
through 2013 across five major product lines.10 To extract a point forecast from the IAM,
we define the IAM Mean as the expected value of the outcome under the distribution over
tickets within the IAM.11 Recalling the notation for actual sales of product i in quarter t
as Yi,t, we refer to the official and IAM forecasts at horizons h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 9} months by
Yˆ
(Official)
i,t|t−h and Yˆ
(IAM)
i,t|t−h , respectively. For each k ∈ {Official, IAM}, we denote the forecast error
as e
(k)
i,t|t−h = Yi,t − Yˆ (k)i,t|t−h to evaluate forecast performance.
To characterize the forecasting environment, Table 1 reports summary statistics for the
point forecasts together with the actual unit sales, including a break down by product lines.
Realized quarterly sales are normalized by product line to average one unit quarterly sales
with a one unit standard deviation. On average, the official and IAM forecasts slightly
overstate average sales, but the bias is less pronounced in the IAM Mean, which improves
upon the Official forecast bias by approximately 5%. Overall, the IAM forecasts deliver a
root mean square error almost 8% lower than that of the Official forecast in the full sample,
with that outperformance being quite stable across all forecast horizons.
The content of Table 1 can be summarized by the following:
Result 3 (Information about Sales Improves as the Forecast Horizon Narrows). The ac-
curacy of point forecasts for both the IAM and the official forecast improve as the forecast
horizon narrows. Conversely, the quality of this information degrades as the forecast horizon
10For proprietary reasons, Intel has requested we mask the actual values of units sold as well as the
names of the products themselves. As all of our comparative analyses are insensitive to the numeraire, this
masking has no effect on the results while allowing us to make our data publicly available. Each product
was normalized to have an average of one unit sold with a unit standard deviation of sales.
11Alternatives, such as the modal forecast are largely the same. Due to the buckets in the mechanism,
these forecasts are effectively interval-censored. To address this censoring, we take the mid-point of the
bucket as representing the value for all forecast mass placed within that bucket. The first and last buckets
representing ranges [0, x1) and [xK−1,∞) are assigned values x1 and xK−1, respectively. While setting
the label for the last bucket to ∞ would clearly be problematic for our results, we have considered several
different specifications for these buckets, with little impact on our results from reasonable treatments.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Forecast Data
This table presents summary statistics characterizing the average and standard deviation of unit sales, the
target variable to be forecast, and the different forecasts we consider. Due to variation in timing of the
horizon forecasts relative to realized sales, the full-sample Root Mean Square Forecast Error is not directly
comparable between the official and IAM forecasts. As such, the official RMSFE is also reported excluding
the least-informed (9 month) horizon forecast and the IAM RMSFE is also reported excluding the
most-informed (1 month) horizon forecast. The columns report results broken down by the forecast horizon
at which forecasts are generated.
Full Forecast Horizon
Sample Last Mth 1-3 Mth 4-6 Mth 7-9 Mth
First Period 200602 200602 200602 200603 200604
Last Period 201303 201303 201303 201303 201303
Num of Obs 930 114 339 312 279
Num of Qtrs 30 30 30 28 26
Average Sales 1.00 0.96 0.97 1.02 1.01
Std Dev Sales 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00
Average Official 1.19 0.99 1.01 1.20 1.40
Std Dev Official 1.04 1.01 1.02 1.04 1.04
Official RMSE 0.96 0.38 0.63 0.97 1.24
Average IAM Mean 1.14 0.93 0.99 1.16 1.32
Std Dev IAM Mean 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.02 1.00
IAM Mean RMSE 0.88 0.29 0.55 0.89 1.15
lengthens. At these long horizons, there may not be substantial information for the IAM to
collect and report.
4.2 Empirical Implications of Information Aggregation
Whether or not the successful information aggregation observed in experimental implemen-
tations of the IAM can be achieved in a field context presents the central empirical question
of our study. Investigating information aggregation in the field is complicated by the econo-
metricians’ inability to access the detailed information used by experimenters in analyzing
laboratory data. The experimental designer knows exactly what the true conditional distri-
bution for Yi,t given all information in the system, providing a host of observable restrictions
with which to test each market. In the field, however, the econometrician only observes
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the realized value of Yi,t, a severely restricted view into the data generating process that
requires leveraging the panel of forecast distributions along with structural assumptions to
test whether it exhibits successful information aggregation.According to definitions 1 and 2,
successful information aggregation is characterized by a match between the empirical distri-
bution of ticket placements in the IAM should and the “true” probabilities of sales (whether
in expectation or exactly). Letting Fi,t|t−h denote the information set of IAM participants
at period t− h, the hypothesis of successful information aggregation can be stated:
Hypothesis 1. Information Aggregation Mechanism Accuracy hypothesis:
Yi,t|Fi,t,t−h d= MN(η˜1|t−h, · · · , η˜K|t−h), ∀i, t, h. (7)
where η˜k|t−h denotes the proportion of tickets placed in bucket k during the IAM at horizon
t− h.
Why might we think Hypothesis 1 holds a priori? Clearly this is a very strong hypothesis
constructed from a set of maintained hypotheses outlined in Section 3 that cannot be tested
directly and have the capacity to lead to the rejection of Hypothesis 1. The equilibrium
model developed in Section 3 reflects principles often found useful for interpreting economic
data but it also rests on a series of “as if” propositions that cannot be examined directly.
At base, Hypothesis 1 is not inconsistent with a body of accepted theory. Furthermore,
Experimental results indicate that the IAM performs as suggested by theory. However, as
highlighted in Section 3.4, there are many instances in which the hypothesis may fail. In
the last analysis, whether or not the hypothesis holds in a given field setting is an empirical
matter.
We can test Hypothesis 1 without additional structural assumptions by defining the
cumulative conditional distribution Gˆi,t|t−h (y) =
∑max{κ|xκ≤y}
k=1 η˜k|t−h corresponding to the
ticket placements at horizon t − h. Then we transform the realized outcome Y(i,t) into its
corresponding quantile in the conditional IAM distribution:
Qˆi,t,h ≡ Gˆi,t|t−h (Yi,t) ∼H0 U [0, 1] (8)
By translating the outcome into its conditional quantile from the IAM, we control for the
heterogeneous conditional distributions from which Yi,t is being realized at different horizons.
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Using the well-know property that the quantiles of a random variable are sampled uni-
formly by the true distribution, in cases where the IAM distribution matches the true con-
ditional distribution for Yi,t|Fi,t|t−h, then Qˆi,t,h ∼ U [0, 1]. Accordingly, we can simply use
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to evaluate whether we can reject that our sample of quantiles
is drawn from a set of uniformly-distributed random variables.12 Analyzing the conditional
quantiles renders the test robust to heterogeneity in the distributions across products, time,
and information sets.13 We summarize this finding with the following result:
Result 4 (Testability of the Full IAM Distribution). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can be
used to measure the degree to which the probabilities of sales in a quarter match the relative
frequencies of actual sales.
4.3 Exact Information Aggregation in Periods with Good Infor-
mation Available
Panel A of Figure 1 shows that the empirical distribution for almost perfectly matches the
uniform distribution quantiles for the last IAM run for the quarter, which occurs around one
week before the quarter ends, but several weeks before sales are finalized. As indicated by the
RMSFE in Table 1, uncertainty in final sales persists even in the last run of the IAM, though
we might expect participants in the IAM to have good information about this uncertainty.
As a setting in which we can be confident that information exists to be aggregated, this
context provides the ideal test for our hypothesis.
The results in Figure 1 support the hypothesis, with a mean absolute deviation of less
than 3% and the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test statistic corresponding to a p-Value of 86%,
indicating that we cannot distinguish the IAM quantiles from the uniform distribution. That
is, the probabilities predicted by the IAM match the relative frequencies of sales. Figure
1’s Panel B extends the sample to include IAM runs to include the two and three month
horizon forecasts, essentially all IAMs run in the quarter for which sales are being forecast.
12Since the IAM quantiles are only available for a discretized support, these quantiles are technically only
identified within a range. As defined above, our reported results treat the probability mass in a bucket as
lying entirely on the minimum of that bucket. However, our qualitative results are not sensitive to this
treatment.
13While robust to heterogeneity, note that various features of our data, especially the panel structure
coupled with multiple horizons, induce correlation across draws. As such, the p-Values of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test are likely to be distorted with a downward bias. Unfortunately, analyzing correlated sampling
structures in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is an intractable problem beyond our scope.
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Visual inspection again verifies that the IAM quantiles match up well with the uniform
distribution. The apparent distortion in the tails does not register as statistically significant,
as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test still lacks significance with a p-Value of 9%.
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Figure 1: Quantile Plots for the Information Aggregation Mechanism
This figure presents the distribution of realized quantiles from the information aggregation mechanism
defined in equation (8) against the theoretically accurate uniform distribution. Panel A reports the results
for the last run of the IAM before the quarter ended. Panel B reports the results for all IAM runs during
the quarter for which sales are being forecast. Mean Abs Dev reports the mean absolute deviation between
the two distributions while the Abs Dev at Median reports the absolute difference between the two
distributions at the median of the uniform distribution. The KS Stat and p-Value report correspond to a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of the distributions.
4.4 Information Aggregation with Limited Information Available
If participants have very little information about the uncertainty in sales, the IAM’s perfor-
mance should deteriorate. This setting provides a sort of placebo test for the IAM, since
if there is no information to aggregate, how could the IAM aggregate information exactly?
To evaluate this effect, we consider the IAM’s performance at long-forecast horizons. In
these markets, we might expect the IAM to aggregate information in expectation, but not
exactly. What are the observational differences between this outcome and exact information
aggregation?
Panels A and B in Figure 2 plot the quantiles of the forecast quantile distribution against
the uniform distribution at short medium (4-6 Months) and long horizons (7-9 Months),
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respectively. Notably, the IAM in this setting no longer plots along the 45 degree line, but
rather follows a distinct S pattern. We also see evidence of the bias in the location of these
forecasting distributions, reflecting optimistic expectations for business performance.
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Figure 2: Quantile Plots for the Information Aggregation Mechanism
This figure presents the distribution of realized quantiles from the information aggregation mechanism
defined in equation (8) against the theoretically accurate uniform distribution. Panel A reports the results
for the IAM’s run 4-6 months before the quarter ended. Panel B reports the results for IAM runs 7-9
months before sales are finalized. Mean Abs Dev reports the mean absolute deviation between the two
distributions while the Abs Dev at Median reports the absolute difference between the two distributions at
the median of the uniform distribution. The KS Stat and p-Value report correspond to a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of the distributions.
Our finding that,the IAM systematically understate tail probability events in the absence
of quality information is related to phenomena which have been much studied in the litera-
ture on betting markets. Specifically, the “favorite-longshot bias (FLB)” is an oft-reported
empirical property in studies on betting markets.14 In data patterns characterized by the
FLB, the parimutuel odds on high probability events understate the realized probabilities
(e.g., the odds on a horse “favored” to win the race understates the true odds of that horse
winning). By contrast, we find a “reverse favorite-longshot bias,” in which elicited beliefs
understate the realized probabilities for low-probability (tail) events.
A number of explanations have been proposed for the FLB, when observed in gambling
environments, including probabilistic misperceptions, risk preferences, belief heterogeneity,
14There are four full chapters dedicated to its review alone in the Handbook of Sports and Lottery Markets
(Hausch and Ziemba (2008a)).
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and information incentives.15 Ottaviani and Sørensen (2010) propose an alternative model of
biases in entertainment-based parimutuel betting systems based on strategic behavior rather
than misperceptions or risk preferences. In this model, parimutuel betting participants are
partially informed about the conditional distribution for a random variable in addition to
aggregate uncertainty about the outcome itself.16 Rational behavior in their model allows for
an FLB or a reverse-FLB in the aggregated distribution depending on the ratio of privately-
held information to noise in the forecast variable. Specifically, the reverse-FLB arises when
information is very diffuse. To see the intuition from a mechanical perspective, consider
the case of Lotto, a uniformly random parimutuel system. Since each number has an equal
probability of being a winning number, any “favorites” which arise during the betting process
must underpay, and “longshots” must overpay: that is, a systematic underweighting of low-
probability events arises in the parimutuel odds.
The results at these horizons underscore the adage that making predictions is hard,
especially about the future. Due to the many composite hypotheses being tested in this
evaluation, there are any number of reasons the IAM performance could break down here. In
the field, we do not have sufficient data to determine what structural model best characterizes
participant behavior. However, the hypothesis that the IAM aggregates information exactly
provides the only plausible explanation for the data’s support of Hypothesis 1 at the 1-3
month horizon.
Result 5 (IAM Accuracy Hypothesis Supported at Short Horizons). Within a two or three
month horizon the probabilities predicted by the IAM are the same as the relative frequencies
of sales. For longer horizons the probabilities of extreme events are understate the actual
probabilities.
15See Ali (1977) for an early reference. Snowberg and Wolfers (2010) compare the relative likelihood of
risk preferences and probabilistic misperception in betting markets, finding probabilistic misperceptions to
be relatively more likely, but are silent on the role of strategic considerations. Gandhi and Serrano-Padial
(2012) show that belief heterogeneity among racetrack bettors can also induce a longshot bias in prices.
16Technically, the model analyzed by Ottaviani and Sørensen (2010) considers a simultaneous move game
that differs from the dynamic IAM here with its increasing prices. Despite this tension in the direct appli-
cation of Ottaviani and Sørensen (2010)’s analysis, it seems reasonable to apply the intuition to the current
setting.
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5 The Information Value of the IAM for Forecasting
We now examine the degree to which information available through the mechanism can help
improve the internal, official forecasts of product sales. Our analysis reveals two key findings.
First, natural forecasts extracted from the IAM provide lower mean square predictive loss
than the official forecast. Second, the IAM reports valuable information relating to expected
sales that is not already reflected in the official forecast. These findings underscore the
information reported by the aggregated information reflected by the IAM is not merely a
restatement of information readily available elsewhere within the organization.
In these tests, we draw on techniques from the forecast evaluation literature (see, for
instance, West (2006) and the references therein) to compare the accuracy of the point
prediction forecast from the IAM with the official forecast. Of course, the feedback between
the official forecast and the IAM induces potential correlation in forecast errors both between
and across forecasts, so we implement our tests to be robust to any correlations that might
arise through this feedback cycle. Direct comparison of the forecasts is somewhat complicated
by the timing of the IAM vis-a-vis the official forecasts. To provide comparable information
sets, we evaluate the IAM forecast relative to the official forecast prepared immediately after
the IAM. Our conservative treatment cedes a slight information advantage to the official
forecast, allowing us to be sure that any outperformance by the IAM is attributable to its
aggregation of dispersed beliefs.
5.1 Predictive Accuracy and Forecast Performance
We begin with a direct horse-race between the IAM Mean forecast and the Official forecast
in terms of forecast error. Diebold and Mariano (1995), henceforth DM, tests provide the
benchmark for directly comparing the predictive accuracy of two forecasts under a variety
of possible loss functions. Treating forecast loss as the square error of the forecast:
l
(k)
i,t|t−h =
(
Yˆ
(k)
i,t|t−h − Yi,t
)2
(9)
We can then compare the loss between two corresponding forecasts j and k:
δ
(j,k)
i,t,h = l
(j)
i,t|t−h − l(k)i,t|t−h (10)
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Table 2: Comparing Forecast Loss Across Mechanisms
This table presents Diebold-Mariano tests comparing the point forecasts from the official forecast and the
mean and mode information aggregation mechanism forecast. The Root Mean ∆ Square Error reports the
square root of the absolute average difference in the square error for the official and IAM forecasts, signed
negatively for cases where the official forecast outperforms the IAM. The Outperformance Frequency
captures the frequency with which the IAM forecast was more accurate than the official forecast. The
DM-Statistic and p-Value report the Diebold-Mariano test statistic and p-Value using standard errors
robust to autocorrelation up to the maximum horizon included in the sample, clustered by period and
product.
Num of Freq IAM Avg Abs ∆ Diebold-Mariano Test
Obs Outperforms Loss(*100) t-Statistic p-Value
Full Sample 930 59% 0.56 (2.78) 0.6%
1 Mth 114 66% 0.34 (2.99) 0.3%
2-3 Mths 225 56% 7.09 (1.81) 7.1%
4-6 Mths 312 58% 6.43 (1.86) 6.4%
7-9 Mths 279 59% 5.22 (1.95) 5.2%
The DM test statistic corresponds to the t-statistic for the average δ
(j,k)
i,t,h , using a robust
estimator of the variance allowing for auto-correlation of loss differentials within product lines
and clustering for each revenue period. While DM’s initial derivation of the test establishes
its asymptotically normality, Harvey et al. (1997) show that Student’s t distribution better
controls for size.
Table 2 shows the IAM forecast clearly outperforms the official forecast in the overall
sample, with the outperformance especially pronounced at the one month horizon where the
IAM Mean outperforms the official forecast 66% of the time. Given the differential timing
of the official forecast release and the mechanism, this treatment cedes a slight information
advantage to the official forecast, which is always released after the mechanism has concluded.
As such, the IAM’s systematic outperformance is especially surprising given that the official
forecasters know the IAM distribution before releasing their forecast.
As Table 2 illustrates, the official forecast deviates from the IAM forecast in the wrong
direction about 59% of the time. The Diebold-Mariano tests provide clear evidence of the
IAM Mean outperforming the official forecast in the full sample and in the 1 month horizon.
Looking at other forecast horizons, the test’s significance drops with the smaller number of
observations, but the IAM Mean is a better forecast than the Official forecast over 55% of
the time across all horizons.
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5.2 Forecast Combination and Encompassing Tests
Beyond its consistent outperformance of the official forecast, we now show that the IAM
contains relevant information about sales that’s not already reflected in the official forecast.
To this end, we analyze how best to combine the information from the IAM forecast with the
official forecasts into a single aggregated forecast to perform a series of encompassing tests.17
If the IAM encompasses the Official forecast, a decision maker who learns the official forecast
after having already observed the IAM would not update their beliefs about potential sales.
If the Official forecast does not encompass the IAM, then the information from the IAM
would be valuable to a decision maker who only has access to that official forecast.
We follow the approach of Fair and Shiller (1990) in applying a regression-based test to
evaluate the encompassing properties of the two forecasts. It’s straightforward to show that
the optimal weights with which to form a linear combination of forecasts can be calculated
using the following regression.
Yi,t = γ + ωIAM Yˆ
(IAM)
i,t|t−h + ωOfficialYˆ
(Official)
i,t|t−h (11)
If the IAM encompasses the official forecast, then the weight assigned to the official fore-
cast in the optimal forecast combination would be zero (i.e., ωOfficial = 0), which can be
evaluated using the standard t-Statistic based on robust standard errors. A sharper test of
encompassing could evaluate the joint hypothesis that ωIAM = 1 and ωOfficial = 0, while an
even sharper test could add the restriction that γ = 0 to the null hypothesis. These tests
are all readily evaluated using F-statistics with robust standard errors.
Rather than the official forecast encompassing the IAM Mean, the results in Table 3
indicate the IAM Mean is more likely to encompass the official forecast than the reverse. In
Panel A’s full sample estimates, the Official forecast is actually negatively weighted, though
this negative weight is not statistically distinguishable from zero. Looking at the horizon
subsamples, we can always reject the hypothesis that the IAM is encompassed by the Official
forecast, that is, the data clearly show that ωIAM 6= 0. However, we cannot always reject
the null hypothesis that ωOfficial = 0, since the optimal forecast weights the official forecast
negatively to control variability in the IAM Mean. We also reject all of the composite
encompassing F-tests, providing statistical evidence of the information value to be gained
by combining the forecasts.
17A robust literature considers optimal forecast combination, with the survey by Timmermann (2006)
providing a good entry point.
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Table 3: Forecast Combination Regressions
This table presents estimates from the forecast combination regressions 11. Panel A uses the full sample of
all forecasts and horizons, with Panels B and C reporting results for horizon and product subsamples. The
test F(0, 1, 0) tests the hypothesis that α = 0, ωIAM = 1, and ωOfficial = 0, similarly, F(0, 0, 1) tests α = 0,
ωIAM = 0, and ωOfficial =. The tests F(., 0, 1) and F(., 0, 1) test the analogous restrictions without the
zero-intercept condition. All tests use standard errors robust to autocorrelation up to the maximum
horizon included in the sample, clustered by period and product.
IAM Mean Official
Intercept Weight Fcst Weight F(0, 1, 0) F(0, 0, 1) F(., 1, 0) F(., 0, 1)
Full Sample 0.32 94% -33% F-Stat 10.05 22.84 14.97 33.03
Std. Error (0.09) (17%) (18%) p-Value 0% 0% 0% 0%
1 Month 0.08 98% -3% F-Stat 5.73 22.57 5.60 31.47
Std. Error (0.03) (13%) (13%) p-Value 0% 0% 0% 0%
2-3 Months 0.17 115% -36% F-Stat 5.65 10.53 8.47 14.96
Std. Error (0.09) (29%) (30%) p-Value 0% 0% 0% 0%
4-6 Month 0.35 85% -26% F-Stat 7.59 13.03 10.69 18.04
Std. Error (0.10) (22%) (24%) p-Value 0% 0% 0% 0%
7-9 Month 0.53 79% -40% F-Stat 8.07 16.13 11.95 24.19
Std. Error (0.17) (29%) (26%) p-Value 0% 0% 0% 0%
Result 6 (IAM Reports Information Not Included in the Official Forecast). The IAM is
more accuracte than the official forecast. An analysis of the optimum combination of frecasts
reveals that the official forecast carries a negative weight, meaning that the predicition of the
IAM can be improved by adding information that the official forecast is systematically wrong
relative to the IAM.
6 Discussion of Conclusions
This paper analyzes a field test of the Information Aggregation Mechanism that was devel-
oped and refined in laboratory experimental environments. The purpose of the mechanism
is to quantize, collect, and aggregate information that is held in the form of intuition by
a dispersed collection of people. Having been adopted to generate monthly predictions of
quarterly sales inside Intel corporation for over seven years, the field test establishes the
robustness of the IAM’s information aggregation properties to applications in uncontrolled
environments,. The results underscore that the IAM performs well in both absolute terms
and relative to other forecasts and that it does so for understandable reasons.
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Results 1 & 2: A Theory of Behavior Bridges the Gap Between Lab and Field
Environments
Our analysis encounters several major differences between field tests and research conducted
under controlled laboratory procedures worthy of mention. A mechanism developed through
the process of laboratory experimentation need not be understood in terms of an overarching
general theory that would be necessary to develop the mechanism following the practice of
mechanism design. Partial theoretical principles, e.g. aspects of rational expectations and
strategic behavior, can be applied and tested in the laboratory because the controlled setting
ensures the experimenter knows all relevant features of incentives and information. Directed
by such partial equilibrium principles, trial and error guides the experimenter through re-
fining the mechanism in response to observed shortcomings. A general theory explaining
behavior is unnecessary in the special cases evaluated in lab settings, but its absence chal-
lenges our confidence when assuming that systems behavior will persist when transferring
from the lab to a field environment. As we no longer know and control the variables driving
individual behavior in that setting, the field environment introduces unmodelled features
that complicate drawing general conclusions regarding a theory of behavior in this setting.
We bridge the laboratory and field setting by presenting a simple theoretical model with
precise assumptions that characterizes the essential observational implications of successful
information aggregation as an outcome of the IAM. Considering information and incentives,
we present theoretical equilibrium properties that motivate the possibility of successful in-
formation aggregation as driven by robust behavioral principles. Though these behavioral
principles are not individually testable in the field, they individually have support from
experimental contexts.
Results 3, 4, & 5: IAM Accurately Reflects Uncertainty in Environments with
Good Information
Our evaluation of the IAM’s performance focuses on the aggregate hypothesis that the proba-
bilities emerging from the IAM should match the relative frequencies of the events predicted.
This reduced-form hypothesis imposes no additional structure on the data generating pro-
cess beyond the simplest conditions for basic measurability, so the statistical tests are both
powerful and robust. Evaluating all moments of the complete distribution reported by the
IAM, we verify this hypothesis in settings where participants have good information about
the uncertainty surrounding potential outcomes. We observe the IAM’s performance degrade
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with the quality of information, as measured by external characteristics of the information
environment. In particular, some systematic error appears in the IAM distribution as the
forecast horizon increases and the bias becomes worse as the official forecast accuracy be-
comes poor.
Result 6: IAM Captures Unique Information Unavailable Elsewhere
We also verify that the IAM reports more information about expected sales than is available
from the official forecast. The IAM forecasts can be improved by incorporating information
from the official forecast, but the optimal forecast combination assigns a negative weight
to the official forecast. Though the official forecast serves many purposes within the orga-
nization, the results demonstrate that the success of the IAM is not exclusively due to a
dependence on the official forecast.
Overall Results: Empirical Support for Information Aggregation in the Field
To our knowledge, the Intel IAM is now the longest-running implementation of
an economically-motivated internal forecasting mechanism in industry, which we
attribute to its unique features that build on experiences with the business ap-
plications of prediction markets. Together the collection of results suggest that the IAM
performance reflects much of the information available on which to base sales predictions.
A tempting working conjecture is that the IAM captures all information available that can
be used to predict future sales, but the data tell us that possibilities for improvement exist.
The fact that predictions can be improved by adding the official prediction as a contrarian
predictor indicates one approach to forecast improvements. Of course, by adding key people,
better data to individuals, and decision aids, the prediction might be further improved.
The results demonstrate that the model performs as predicted. Does it do it for the
right reasons? We modestly admit the answer to that question cannot be known with any
confidence through field testing. Many maintained assumptions that lie at the heart of our
working model could fail and the resulting inaccuracies and errors could be offsetting. We
do know the essential features of the model are supported by experimental evidence. We
also know that key implications of the model exhibit powerful observable restrictions in both
experiments and in applications. These implications, motivated by the underlying model and
theory, are supported a successful field test. Thus, the information aggregation implications
revealed by the model in experiments appear robust in their application to uncontrolled
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environments.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2. [Information Aggregation as an Equilibrium Property]
• Suppose the information aggregation environment is characterized by the distributional
assumptions embedded in equations 1 - 5. Suppose further that all private signals are
publicly revealed, so that p˜n,k = p˜k = E [pik|s1, . . . , sn, α] ,∀n, k
• Suppose tickets are infinitely divisible and each player places their tickets proportionally
to the posterior expected cell probabilities, so that νn,k ∝ p˜k,∀n, k.
This behavioral strategy represents the unique symmetric equilibrium outcome with agree-
ment, under which the IAM aggregates information in expectation. Further, as information
accumulates and M →∞, then p˜k → pik and the IAM aggregates information exactly in this
equilibrium.
Part 1: Best Response Along Equilibrium Path
Given expected cell probabilities and other players’ ticket placements, it is optimal for a
player to place tickets according to the expected cell probabilities. This partial-equilibrium
result establishes that the above assumptions suffice for νn,k ∝ p˜k, ∀n, k, to be a best response.
Consider the decision problem faced by the n-th player, conditioning on the players’
beliefs p˜n, k = p˜k and the assumption that all other players are placing their tickets pro-
portionally to the aggregate posterior beliefs. Player n’s payoff from any ticket allocation
is:
E [un (ν) |s1, . . . , sN , α] =
K∑
k=1
νn,k
(N − 1) p˜k + νn,kE [pik|s1, . . . , sN , α] =
K∑
k=1
νn,k
(N − 1) p˜k + νn,k p˜k
Taking first order conditions of the Lagrangian that incorporates a shadow cost (λ) for the
constraint that tickets be fully allocated:
∂
∂νn,k
E [un (ν) |s1, . . . , sN , α] = (N − 1) p˜
2
k
((N − 1) p˜k + νn,k)2
− λ = 0
K∑
k=1
νn,k = 1
The budget constraint enforces these first order conditions to balance across each of the K
cells, so player n’s utility maximizing strategy accords with the equilibrium prediction that
the players allocate tickets according to the posterior expected cell probabilities.
(N − 1) p˜2k
((N − 1) p˜k + νn,k)2
=
(N − 1) p˜2j
((N − 1) p˜j + νn,j)2
=⇒ νn,k
νn,j
=
p˜k
p˜j
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Part 2: Uniqueness of Equilibrium Outcome
We now establish uniqueness of the equilibrium outcome. First, we show that at least one
player has a profitable deviation if the IAM’s distribution of tickets is not proportional to
the agreed-upon posterior odds. Second, we show that asymmetric ticket allocations are not
supportable with agreement.
(a) Suppose the IAM’s distribution of tickets is not proportional to p˜, then at least one
player has a profitable deviation.
Without loss of generality, suppose p˜1 > η1 and order the indices so that
p˜1
η1
≥ p˜2
η2
≥ · · · ≥
p˜K
ηK
. Choose as player 1 a subject that weakly underallocates tickets to bucket 1, so that
ν1,1 ≤ η1 < p˜1 and select bucket k so that ν1,k ≥ ηk. Consider the gains and losses to player
1 from shifting  tickets from bucket k to bucket 1.
Gains from Increasing ν1,1:
(
ν1,1+
Nη1+
− ν1,1
Nη1
)
p˜1 =
Nη1−ν1,1
Nη1+
p˜1
η1

N
Cost of Decreasing ν1,k:
(
ν1,k−
Nηk− −
ν1,k
Nηk
)
p˜k =
Nηk−ν1,k
Nηk−
p˜k
ηk

N
We want to show that this deviation is profitable for some  > 0, for which it will be
sufficient to show:
Nη1 − ν1,1
Nη1
p˜1
η1
=
(
1− ν1,1
Nη1
)
p˜1
η1
>
(
1− ν1,k
Nηk
)
p˜k
ηk
=
Nηk − ν1,k
Nηk
p˜k
ηk
This inequality holds by the assumptions of our construction:
p˜1
η1
− p˜k
ηk
≥ ν˜1,1
η1︸︷︷︸
≤1
p˜1
η1
− ν˜1,k
ηk︸︷︷︸
≥1
p˜1
η1
p˜k
ηk
=⇒ p˜1
η1
− p˜k
ηk
>
1
N
(
ν˜1,1
η1
p˜1
η1
− ν˜1,k
ηk
p˜k
ηk
)
(b) Suppose the IAM’s distribution of tickets is proportional to p˜, so that p˜1
η1
= p˜2
η2
= · · · = p˜K
ηK
,
but two players are not playing the same strategy. At least one player has a profitable
deviation.
Suppose player 1’s allocaiton differs from the IAM odds. Let ν1,1 = η1 − ξ, ν1,2 = η2 + ξ,
and consider the gains and losses to player 1 from shifting  = ξ/N tickets from bucket 2 to
bucket 1.
Gains from Increasing ν1,1:
Nη1−ν1,1
Nη1+

N
Cost of Decreasing ν1,2:
Nη2−ν1,2
Nη2−

N
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We will show this deviation is profitable by verifying that:
Nη1 − ν1,1
Nη1 + 
>
Nη2 − ν1,2
Nη2 − 
This inequality can be established by direct substitution:
Nη1−ν1,1
Nη1+
= (N−1)η1+ξ
Nη1+ξ/N
; Nη2−ν1,2
Nη2− =
(N−1)η2−ξ
Nη1−ξ/N
Then:
(N − 1) η1 + ξ
(N − 1) η2 − ξ >
Nη1 + ξ
Nη2 − ξ >
Nη1 + ξ/N
Nη2 − ξ/N =⇒
Nη1 − ν1,1
Nη1 + 
>
(N − 1) η2 − ξ
Nη1 − ξ/N
Part 3: Information Aggregation Properties
By the agreement assumption and the results of Parts (1) and (2), the IAM ticket allocation
represents rational expectations for E [pi|s1, . . . , sN , α]. Clearly, if every player places tickets
proportionally to p˜, then the aggregated distribution of tickets in the IAM will match this
distribution. As in Proposition 1, information accumulates with either a large number of
players or with players’ signal counts, allowing for the application of a Law of Large Numbers
to show that the IAM aggregates information exactly.
Experimental Instructions (Not for Publication)
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Forecasting Instructions –  (date and time) 
Forecasting (variable to be forecast)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategy: 
1. You start with 500 units of house money for each quarter.  Spend it all – but not 
on one forecast range unless you are certain. 
2. Watch what others are doing.  The objective is to win money, not simply to record 
your beliefs. 
3. Prices will start at 5 units/ticket and not change for the first 15 minutes.  Then 
they will go up by one unit per minute for 45 minutes.  Do not wait too long to buy.  
To purchase a ticket: 
1. Click the white box of the 
range you choose 
2. Enter the number of tickets 
3. Click Purchase 
The price of a 
ticket will start to 
increase 15 minutes 
into the session 
Your unspent cash used to 
purchase tickets – compare to 
ticket price – separate budget 
for each quarter/column 
Total tickets sold to all 
participants for all quarters 
Your chances of winning 
prizes are determined by the 
percentage of tickets in the 
correct forecast held by you 
Each column lists 
the set of forecasts 
for one quarter and 
total tickets sold 
Practice: 
http://location and time 
Real Deal: 
Time and location 
 
Procedure 
Step 1: Register 
Register yourself in the system database.  If you are not in the database the system 
will force you to register when you try to log into the Real Deal. 
 
Go to (at any time including now) http://xxxx.caltech.edu/xxx 
Select “Sign up as a new user”.  Choose an ID, a password, and enter a number into 
the “SS Number” field.  We are not using real social security numbers – just pick a 
number with 9 digits that you can remember (or write down).  Part of a phone 
number might be a good idea. 
 
Everyone should enter the following information.  It will not be used for anything 
but is required in the stock application we are using. 
 
University = “Company A” and Class = “Company A” 
Street = “123 Main Street” City = “Anytown” 
State = “CA”  Zip = “12345” Country = “USA” 
Enter your real e-mail address and phone number.  (Enter area code “123” and 
then your real seven digit Intel phone number.) 
 
Step 2: Practice 
Go to the practice page http://xxxx.caltech.edu/Sales-practice/ prior to the Real Deal 
to become familiar with the forecasting application.  Buy tickets for a few different 
forecasts and observe how the application responds. 
 
Step 3: Get your secure ID 
On the day of the Real Deal, ideally a few minutes before the start time, go to the 
Real Deal location, http://xxxxcaltech.edu/BusinessUnitYearQ#Date/.  It will ask 
you for the user name and password that you used in Step 1.  It will then give you 
your secure ID, which disguises your identity.  Click the “Login” button to enter the 
Real Deal.  You will not be able to use the application until the session begins. 
 
Step 4: Participate in the Real Deal 
The session will be held on November 7 at 4:00 PM Pacific Time.  Be on time – a few 
minutes early would be wise.   The trial will start exactly on time, allowing for clock 
differences, and move very quickly.  It will likely be over in 30 minutes even though 
it will remain open for an hour. 
 
Panics or problems: e-mail or call Mister X at ###-###-####.  He will be working 
with Caltech to manage the trial and solve any problems. 
 
We will put general announcements (if needed) on the Real Deal screens. 
 
Determining Winners 
Four prizes will be awarded for each of the three quarters forecast 
during the trial – see details below.  We will know which forecast is 
correct once actual Q4 2006 and Q1, Q2 2007 Business Unit Billings are 
available.  Prizes for each quarter will be awarded after the close of that 
quarter.  All tickets in the correct forecast are considered winning 
tickets and will be entered into a drawing for prizes.  After each prize 
drawing the winning ticket will be put back in the hopper, so each ticket 
may win more than one prize. 
 
Q4 2006 
Drawing 1: $100 
Drawing 2: $100 
Drawing 3: $50 
Drawing 4: $50 
Q1 2007 
Drawing 1: $100 
Drawing 2: $100 
Drawing 3: $50 
Drawing 4: $50 
Q2 2007 
Drawing 1: $100 
Drawing 2: $100 
Drawing 3: $50 
Drawing 4: $50 
 
These prizes will be distributed as an employee recognition award in the 
near term.  Alternative payment methods may be developed in the long 
term. 
 
 
Privacy 
Participants will remain completely anonymous except to the research 
team at Caltech and to Mister X, the research manager at Company A.  
No one else participating in the trial will know for certain who is 
participating, so they certainly will not know which forecasts you 
choose.  The final forecast generated by all participants will be 
published, but your personal forecast will be held in confidence by the 
research team.  We will award prizes to the winners, but even the 
winners will not be announced. 
 
We expect that participants will not share information with one another 
before, during or after the trial.  Past research has shown that the best 
results are achieved when participants do not share information. 
 
